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ABSTRACT 
Many developing countries are currently involved In 
adjusting their policy regime from one which is Inward-oriented,
 
import substitution-based, to one which is more neutral or
 
perhaps slightly biased towards exports. It is argued in this
 
paper that some of thG policies that are adopted to achieve this
 
outcome may have implications for the size structure of industry.
 
Using the examp'e of Korea and Taiwan, the paper develops
 
three hypotheses which it argues should be the focus of future
 
research.
 
1. Small and medium enterprises may have more difficulty in
 
participating in export trade than larger firms insofar
 
as the fixed informational costs of selling abroad are
 
substantial,
 
2. From the perspective of small and medium firms seeking to
 
expand exports, a laissez faire, outward-oriented policy
 
is preferable to a policy involving protection plus
 
tariff dravwiackst even if these drawbacks are provided
 
automatically to exporting firms.
 
3. In general, given the relationships between the
 
transactions costs to a bureaucracy of dealing directly
 
with individual firms and the absolute magnitude of
 
response on the part of enterprises, it seems plausible
 
that the grater the degree to which governments use
 
methods of direct, discretionary intervention to achieve
 
their economic goalst the more difficult is likely to be
 
the economic environment for small and medium firms,
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The comparative experience of less developed countries over the
 
past two decades has revealed that outward-oriented policies which
 
encourage the export of manufactures are more likely to yield
 
sustained, employment-intensive industrial expansion than are policies
 
of import-substituting industrialization. 1/ What role can small and
 
medium firms play in the expansion of manufactures exports? To what
 
degree does their role vary with the particular mechanisms through
 
which policies to promote manufactures exports are implemented?
 
This paper .explores these questions by focusing on the experiences
 
of Korea and Taiwan, two countries that have been extraordinarily
 
successful in promoting economic development via the expansion of
 
manufactures exports.2/ The paper will delineate the character cf the
 
policies adopted to promote manufactures exports, with special emphasis
 
on some institutional features that are both less familiar than the
 
broad countours of policy in the two countries, and are of particular
 
importance to small and medium enterprises. In addition, as a prelude
 
to subsequent micro field work in the two countries the paper will lay
 
out some preliminary propositions as to the implications of these
 
institutional features for small and medium enterprises.
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The Macro Prices of Traded Goods in Korea and Taiwan
 
'Getting prices right' -- that is, allowing the prices of both
 
inputs and outputs to reflect their opportunity costs -- has long been
 
recognized as the starting point of a policy of outward-oriented
 
industrial expansion. On the product side, 'getting prices right' has
 
meant in large part setting -- qnd maintaining -- a realistic price for
 
foreigi exchange in terms of local currency, and ensuring that there is
 
no systematic bias that induces firms to produce for the local rather
 
than export market.
 
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that -- as numerous studies have attested
 
-- both Korea and Taiwan have ensured that thE macro prices of traded
 
goods meet these criteria. Thus both countries have maintained a
 
single, unified exchange rate ever since their outward-oriented
 
policies first were underway. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, both
 
countries have generally ensured that real effective exchange rates for
 
exporters remained stable over time. 4/ In Korea in particular, where
 
domestic inflation has consistently been more rapid than world
 
inflation, the policy response has been to combine periodic
 
devaluations with adjustments in export incentives so as to maintain
 
export earnings at a rate equal or in excess of 300 real 1965 won per
 
dollar.
 
Table 2 presents average data on relative effective subsidies -­
average effective rates of protection adjusted for differential taxes
 
and subsidies for foreign and local sales for the manufacturing sector
 
as a whole for Korea and Taiwan as well as, for purposes of comparison,
 
Colombia and Argentina. As the table shows, the balance of support in
 
Table 1: Real Effective Exchange Rates for Exporters in Taiwan and Korea
 
Taiwan (1960 Taiwanese Korea (1965 won per 
dollars per U.S. $) 'U.S.$) 
1962 39.6 264.2 
1963 37.4 276.1 
1964 37.8 305.3 
1965 39.9 304.6 
1966 39.4 305.1 
1967 38.3 298.8 
1968 39.4 298.7 
1969 40.4 299.4 
1970 41.9 307.9 
1971 43.0 328.6 
1972 43.8 348.9 
1973 39.0 396.5 
1974 29.9 338.4 
1975 34.1 320.9 
1976 38.8 
Sources: Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Korea"; and T.H. Lee and Kuo-Shin 
Liang, "Taiwan", in Bela Balassa and Associates, Development Strategies 
In Semi-Industrial Economies 
Press for World Bank, 1982), 
(Washington: Johns 
pp. 218, 314. 
Hopkins University 
Table 2: Relative Incentive to Sales in Domestic and in Export Markets 
for Manufacturing-", Selected Countries
 
Ratio of Effective Subsidy for Domestic 
Sales relative to Effective Subsidy 
for Export Sales
 
Korea (1968) 0,93 
Taiwan (1969) 0.97 
Colombia (1969) 1,42 
Argentina (1969) 2,92 
Source: 	Bela Balassa and Associates, Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial
 
Econom.ies, pp. 32-33,
 
Notes : 1/ Manufacturing is defined here to include intermediate products I & II, 
Nondurable consumer goods, consumer durables, machinery and 
transport equipment. 
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Korea and Taiwan on average marginally favored exports; by contrast, in
 
Colombia and especially Argentina, support was skewed
 
disproportionately towards production for local markets.
 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 are by now familiar to many development
 
economists. What may be less familiar -- and what is of particular
 
relevance to our analysis of the role of small and medium enterprlses
 
-- is that, for all that macro prices in Korea and Taiwan were 'right'
 
on average, in neither country can trade policy be described as laissez
 
faire. As Tables 3 and 4 reveal, underlying the average data in Table 2
 
are substantial variations both in effective subsidies across sectors
 
and, within sectors, in relative subsidies for foreign and local sales.
 
The presence of these variations in effective subsidies has two
 
important implications for policies that aim at the expansion of
 
manufactures exports. First, their presence raises the possibility that
 
the government in either country might manipulate the subsidies on a
 
discretionary basis in order to favor -- or to achieve finely
 
calibrated responses from -- individual firms, cross-subsidizing low
 
profit exports, with high levels of protection for local sales; as we
 
shall see, there is some evidence that the Korean government in
 
particular engaged in this practice. Second, in the absence of
 
compensating policies the prevalence of protection against imports in a
 
wide range of sectors would place exporters from both countries at a
 
disadvantage in world markets: as a result of protection the cost of
 
their inputs would be above world prices faced by their competit,)rs.
 
Yet, as the records of the two countries reveal, exporters from these
 
countries are anything but disadvantaged. One key reason is that both
 
countries have mounted extensive tariff-rebate programs to ensure that
 
Table 3: Effective Subsidies for Manufacturing in Korea (1968) and
 
Taiwan (1969), Disaggregated by Product-Type (percentage excess of
 
domestic value added over world market value added) 
EXPORT SALES DOMESTIC SALES AVERAGE SALES 
Korea Taiwan Korea 'Taiwan 'Korea Taiwan 
Intermediate 43 29 -30 36 -22 34 
Products I 
Intermediate 17 30 20 26 19 27 
Products II 
Non-durable 5 10 -21 9 -15 9 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer 2 30 38 44 31 38 
Durables 
Machinery 5 11 31 - 3 31 0 
Transport -23 10 159 66 159 53 
Food 2 30 -25 1 -23 7 
Construction 6 5 -17 -15 -16 -12 
TOTAL 12 23 - 7 18 - 5 20 
Source: As in Table 1 
Table 4: 	Effective Subsidies in Manufacturing in Korea (1968) and Taiwan (1969),
 
Disaggregated by Trade-orientation of Products (percentage)
 
EXPORT SALES DOMESTIC SALES AVERAGE SALES
 
Korea Taiwan -Kc-Ea -Taiwan Korea Taiwan
 
Export1 / 16 19 -15 7 -3 11 
Export-and- 2/ 
Import-Competing 
9 23 55 27 38 25 
Import-Competing3 / 39 15 100 61 99 55 
Non-Impor4! 
Competing 
2 3 -14 -18 -14 -17 
All 5/ 14 21 7 17 8 18
 
Manufacturing
 
Source: Bela Balassa, Development Strategies in Semi-industrial Economies, pp. 34-5
 
Notes : I/ 	Export sectors are defined to be those sectors where exports exceed 10
 
percent of production and imports amount to under 10 percent of consumption.
 
2/ 	Export-and-import competing sectors are defined to be those sectors where
 
exports exceed 10 percent of production, and imports exceed 10 percent
 
of consumption.
 
3/ 	Import-competing sectors are defined to be those sectors where exports
 
amount to under 10 percent of production, and imports exceed 10 percent
 
of consumption.
 
4/ 	Non-import-competing sectors are defined to be those sectors where exports
 
amount to under 10 percent of production, and imports amount to under
 
10 percent of consumption.
 
5/ 	Differences in value for the "all manufacturing' category Tables 3 and
 
4 are a result of differences in definition of the aggregate manufacturing
 
sector.
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the price environment faced by exporters approximates what it would be
 
in a free trade world.
 
The next section of this paper explores in depth the character of
 
the compensating and cross-incentive programs in Korea and Taiwan. As
 
will become clear, in contrast to textbook outward-oriented policies
 
where the task of government is to 'get prices right' and thereafter
 
remain at arms-length from the fray of market activity, compensating
 
and cross-incentive programs involve a more activist role for
 
government and thereby -- in practice if not in intent -­
discrimination against small and medium enterprises.
 
Compensating for Price Distortions
 
This section focuses on three mechanisms that compensate exporters
 
for domestic price distortions and explores their implications for
 
small and medium enterprises. Compensatory drawback schemes are
 
examined first; then the focus turns to export processing zones;
 
finally, some evidence is presented on the role of cross-subsidization.
 
Drawback schemes. Both Taiwan and Korea have made extensive use of
 
drawback schemes that rebate to exporters (or exempt exporters from)
 
any indirect taxes, including taxes on imports, for which they might be
 
liable. In Taiwan, between 1963 and 1972 the value of drawbacks on
 
import taxes ranged between 5 and 10 percent of the total value of
 
imp'mts; in 1972 exemptions (4 1.8%) or drawbacks (6.3%) of tariffs on
 
imports procured by exporters together accounted for 48.1% of total
 
potential customs revenues.5/ In Korea, tariff exemptions amounted in
 
1968 to 14I.4 percent 6/ of export value.77/
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These drawback schemes have a two-fold purpose. One purpose that
 
has already been noted is to ensure that exporters do not face
 
disproportionately high input costs, and thus are able to compete on
 
equal terms with competitors from other countries. A second purpose is
 
to ensure that local suppliers of intermediate inputs needed by export
 
equal terms with inputs imported from
producers can compete at least on 

abroad. If we are to understand how the use of drawback schemes to
 
attain these objectives affects small and medium enterprises, it is
 
necessary to outline the mechanics of the scihemes in some detail.
 
To begin with drawbacks for direct exporters, in both Korea and
 
Taiwan exporters automatically are granted licenses for importing the
 
inputs they require, and are either rebated or excused payment of any
 
tariffs on their imports. In consequence, exporters can choose freely
 
on the basis of price and quality between importing inputs and
 
procuring them from local suppliers.
 
Exporters in both countries have been permitted twastage
 
allowances' whereby the quantities of inputs imported are permitted to
 
exceed what is required for export production; the Korean government in
 
particular has used its discretionary control over these wastage
 
allowances as a mechanism for penalizing and rewarding firms on the
 
basis of their export performcnce.8 / But to ensure that drawback
 
schemes do not undercut entirely the protectionist purposes for which
 
tariffs were imposed in the first place, both countries have devised
 
mechanisms for ensuring that by and large drawbacks are available only
 
for goods produced for export, not for production geared to the local
 
market.
 
Rather than rely on the bureaucratically cumbersome (and
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potentially vulnerable to corruption) practice of requiring
 
case-by-case evidence of whether inputs are for domestic or foreign
 
sales, both Korea and Taiwan have made extensive use of input-output
 
coefficients: exporters are required to give evidence of the value of
 
actual -- or expected -- exports of a particular product; and
 
input-output coefficients, determined by government, serve as the basis
 
for calculating what input tariff rebates are due on these exports. The
 
data requirements are staggering: in 1968, the Taiwanese used over
 
9/
 
7,000 distinct coefficients to calculate their tariff rebates. Prior
 
to 1979 the Koreans had 17,000 input classifications for 6,000 export
 
items; after streamlining their system in 1979, these numbers fell to
 
10/ 
11,000 input classifications for 3,000 export commodities. Yet for
 
all of this complexity, as export performance in the 	two countries
 
11/
successful.

attests, these drawback systems have been 

How do drawback schemes affect exporting by small and medium
 
enterprises? Insofar as drawbacks are available for all firms,
 
irrespective of size, there is no direct discrimination against small
 
and medium enterprises. Both Taiwan and Korea have adopted the
 
principle of automatic access to drawbacks by all firms, although their
 
is some indication that in Korea drawbacks -- as well as other
 
incentives for exporters -- are 3vailable only for firms above 
a
 
minimum size threshold. 12/ But even in the absence of direct
 
discrimination, when contrasted with a trade regime that involves
 
neither protection nor drawbacks, it seems plausible to hypothesize
 
that drawback schemes act as a disincentive to expert by small and
 
medium enterprises. The reason has to do with the differential impact
 
by firm size of the transactions costs that firms must bear in dealing
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with the government agencies that administer drawbacks.
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate diagramatically how the transactions
 
costs of drawback schemes discriminate in practice against exporting by
 
small and medium enterprises. As Figure 1 clarifies, insofar as the
 
bureaucratic costs of claiming a drawback are invariant to the volume
 
of exports, while the value of the rebate rises proportionately with
 
the value of exports, below some level of exports -- say Q -- there is
 
no incentive to claim a rebate. Translated into the terminology of
 
Figure 2, when contrasted to average production costs in a laissez
 
faire free trade regime, a system cf drawbacks implies higher average
 
variable costs of production for levels of export below Q1, and higher
 
average fixed costs for export levels above Q1. While it is marginal
 
costs that determine -- given entry to a particular market -- what
 
quantity will be produced (and, in this example, exported), average
 
costs determine whether production will occur in the first place.
 
Moreover, as a simple matter of arithmetic, the influence of fixed
 
costs on average total costs will be larger the smaller is the total
 
volume of production. Figure 2 illustrates the implication of these
 
propositions for the present analysis: the effect of a drawback scheme
 
is to shift the average total cost schedule upwards, with proportionate
 
increases in average costs largest at lower export levels. Assuming an
 
export price of P1, in a laissez faire regime the minimum volume at
 
which firms will begin to export will be Q2; but in a system involving
 
drawbacks only larger firms, capable of exporting at least Q3 units of
 
output, will engage in export trade.
 
As will shortly be clarified, an analysis of transactions costs
 
may not only be helpful in explaining why the insertion of an added
 
FIGURE 1
 
Total Rebate Value 
Total 
Fixed 
Costs 
Qi 
FIGURE 2
 
\ ATC' 
ATC \ 
AVAVG 
AFC'C 
i 
Q1 Q2 Q3 
AFC 
AFC (AFC') 
AVC (AVC') 
ATC (ATC') 
= Average fixed expott costs in a laissez faire (drawback 
compensated) trade regime 
= Average variable export costs in a laissez faire (drawback 
compensated) trade regime 
= Average total export costs in a laissez faire (drawback 
compensated) trade regime 
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bureaucratic requirement discriminates against small and medium-sized
 
firms. It also is relevant in exploring the impact of the second large
 
function of drawback schemes on these enterprises: in both Korea and
 
Taiwan, drawback schemes ensure that local suppliers of intermediate
 
inputs needed by export producers can compete at least on equal terms
 
with inputs imported from abroad.
 
Insofar as direct exporters have access to both automatic import
 
licenses and rebates on import tariffs, it follows that for local
 
suppliers of intermediate inputs to secure orders from exporters they
 
must offer goods of international quality at internationally
 
competitive prices. Thus, in the absence of some form of relief local
 
suppliers would face negative effective rates of protec%.ion: they would
 
have to sell their output at world prices, but secure their own inputs
 
at relatively high cost in domestic markets.
 
To overcome this problem, both Korea and Taiwan have extended
 
their drawback schemes to indirect exporters, though in subtly
 
different ways. In both countries, indirect exporters are responsible
 
for providing documentary evidence of the extent to which their output
 
has gone into the production of export goods. 13/ The two countries
 
differ, however, i.n the kinds of support they offer indirect exporters.
 
The Taiwanese scheme is both more straightforward and provides
 
higher levels of support to at least some indirect exporters: the
 
government simply pays indirect exporters whatever tariff protection
 
they would have received -- the difference between local and world
 
prices -- had they sold their wares to producers for the local
 
14/
 
market. Indirect exporters -- and firms that supply indirect
 
exporters (who are entirely unaffected by any drawback scheme) -- thus
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enjoy equivalent Jevels of effective protection in domestic and foreign
 
15/
 
markets.
 
By contrast, the Korean scheme places greater pressure on indirect
 
exporters to become internationally competitive themselves. The Korean
 
input-output coefficients apply to whole chains of vertically-related
 
activities: suppliers of intermediate goods to direct exporters can
 
obtain rebates on tariffs for their inputs; and suppliers of inputs to
 
intermediate producers can themselves obtain rebates.... all the way
 
back to primary producers. The Korean scheme thus differs from its
 
Taiwanese counterpart in two ways: in the absence of other incentives,
 
indirect exporters in Korea enjoy zero -- rather than either positive
 
or negative -- effective rates of protection; and the drawback paper
 
chain -- which in Taiwan stops at the level of the immediate producer
 
of intermediate inputs for exporters -- can sometimes unfold through
 
layer upon layer of intermediate producer.
 
These drawback schemes for indirect exporters have both advantages
 
and disadvantages for small and medium enterprises. The disadvantage is
 
that they involve bureaucratic costs for firms, and thus --. compared
 
with laissez faire trade policies -- the kinds of disincentives for
 
small and medium enterprises that have already been analyzed in the
 
context of direct exports. But, given policies of protection plus
 
drawback, they are advantageous insofar as small and medium enterprises
 
are more likely to participate in manufactures exporters as indirect
 
than as direct exporters.
 
It is again transactions costs that explain why small and medium
 
enterprises are more likely to be indirect than direct exporters; now,
 
though, the relevant transactions costs are not those of dealing with
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government but the informational costs associated with penetrating
 
foreign markets. Later in-this p er we4ill explore in some detail the 
mechanisms through which bot Koen a4Taiwanese fJis overrame the
 
barriers to sale in foreign markef. For-mow, it"suffices to note that
 
-- except where the marketing function ib performed by specialized
 
local intermediaries -- exprtingecessl .ily of 
one kind or another betwee loca1lpr s andfforiigners.; and that 
successful communication requires skillsthat -unlike the s]kills 6f
 
selling locally -- are not likely to-be,:earned in the coursp of the 
normal pursuit of everyday b6iness t--iytes Thwse-traasactiAns 
costs of exporting are, 1ik6 the costg-_ f-dealing with a bureaucracy,
 
fixed costs. And in waysithAt prkdeale bureautratc osts,jtheir 
existence implies that t'e.min sca_-va tw ch-f ins enar 6p*t 
markets is likely to be y-.a lalt 
.:Indirect exporting ;%abe 1 -io firq'tb 
participate in export trad,whi- typaing th" tranActionv ostJof 
foreign marketing. And dr 4 .ack i eme.; ;or id ect porte enS . 
that skewed incenti-ves do -t prP ude " al s5 ,.ier of in rmedi e 
6 n ri" 1n~vi f g*Pinput$ A-- Sml -dm 
benefits of pomewrdoieS i t-ri h~ n 
then,.hetall,ef of b che on all ed 
enterprises is mixd- Frod spec vvof *m 1 ad-medi rwfir*-. 
falre tr e whpepicy 
,that are poteltial exportLr{ a a f re tr e plic 
reflect international-opporfpnit, costs7is pre~elable' to a policy 
draw :k " 4 e s -"ea 
is crucial that they'd} nv ini 
finteradiateinput The en 
-11­
policies for small and medium enterprises is one that rebates tariffs
 
to direct but not indirect exporters, leaving tie latter saddled with
 
negative effective rates of protection and thus -- given the high
 
levels of protection provided if sales are to local markets -- with no
 
incentive to participate in the export sector of the economy.
 
Fxport processing zones. Export processing zones (EPZs) -- zones
 
which bring together within a delineated area the opportunity for
 
tariff-free trade, an industrial estate, and all relevant government
 
offices -- can, like drawback schemes, ensure that exporters are able
 
to be competitive in world markets. Such iones have been established in
 
both Taiwsn and Korea. Taian opened the world's fir.t modern EPZ at
 
Kaohsiung City in 1965; subsequently two more zones were established,
 
at Nantze and Taikiung. 16/ Korea opened its first zone in Masan in
 
1971, and a second in Iri in 1975.17/
 
Given the earlier start-up of EFZs in Taiwan than in Korea it is
 
not surprising that, while only a cumulative gross value of $20 million
 
of exports had flowed from Korea's EPZ by mid-1973, in that year the
 
gross value of exports from the zones in Taiwan exceeded $400 million;
 
nett of imported inputs, the 1973 export value amounted to marginally
 
more than $100 million. 18/ In 1979, 57% of the entire output of
 
Taiwan's EPZs was composed of goods from the electronics sector. 19/ In
 
neither country have the zones ever accounted for more than a small
 
fraction of total exports: exports from EPZs amounted to only 8.5% of
 
Taiwanese exports in 1975; at no point have they accounted for more
 
20 1
than 10 percent of Korean exports.

At first blush given our earlier analysis of transactions costs,
 
the presence of EPZs -- and the associated easing of bureaucratic
 
-12­
hassles -- might appear to add to the opportunities for small and 
medium enterprises to participate in outward-oriented expansion. But 
closer ccnsideration suggests that such a conclusion would be at the 
very least premature. For one thing, EPZs per se do nothing to offset 
the informational costs of exporting which were argued earlier to 
represent a difficult barrier for small and medium enterprises. Perhaps 
more importantly, EPZs generally are not set up to attract small and 
medium enterprises; indeed, it may turn out that the licensing 
requirements for entering an EPZ positively discriminate against these 
firms. Rather the focus is on providing an investment environment that 
is favorable to foreign investors. Thus by 1976, 82% of the cumulative 
value of investment by private firms in Taiwan's EPZs had been made by 
foreigners. 2 1/ Finally, insofar as EPZs delineate a region free of 
standard putlic regulations, the effect is almost to erect a trade wall 
between the simplified EPZ environment and the rest of the national 
economy. Thus between 1966 and 1974 local sources supplied less than 14 
percent of the machinery, equipment and materials requirements of EPZ
 
eAp.)rters in Taiwan.22/ It was argued earlier that indirect exporting
 
is likely to represent an important way in which small Lnd medium
 
enterprises share in the benefits of export expansion. Yet, if the
 
Taiwanese experience is typical, EPZs would seem to add to the
 
obstacles of indirect exporters.
 
Cross-subsidies for exports. The two mechanisms examined thus far
 
both offset directly the disabilities to exporters that result from
 
ongoing protection from import competition in Taiwan and Korea. The
 
existence of the third mechanism -- the cross-subsidization of exports
 
through import barriers and the associated profits for domestic
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producers selling to local markets - also depends on the persistence 
of prot2ction. Unlike the other two mechanisms, however, it can 
function not merely to offset the burden of import tariffs but also as 
a means of indirectly subsidizing exports. To what degree has 
cross-subsidization been practiced in Taiwan and Korea? Insofar as it 
has been used, what implications does it have for small and medium 
enterprises? 
Westphal and Kim (1982) have asserted (based in part on the
 
institutional analyses of Jones and Sakong (1979) and Rhee et al (1984)
 
) that the Korean government used cross-subsidization as a targeted
 
mechanism to achieve finely calibrated responses from individual firms
 
-- the government has enabled some firms to earn high profits from
 
local sales behind protective barriers, but only on the condition that
 
they also exported some of their output. Although evidence on the
 
prevalence of cross-subsidization is incomplete, especially for Taiwan,
 
the data presented in Table 4 earlier does provide some grounds for
 
speculation.
 
To begin with Korea, at levels of 55 percent above value added in
 
world prices, effective subsidies for domestic sales in
 
export-and-import competing sectors (sectors where by definition a
 
significant fraction of output was being exported) were way above 
average subsidy levels. The table shows also that subsidies in 
import-competing sectors were largest of all; however, in the absence 
of evidence that these sectors also exported -- high effective 
subsidies for exports could plausibly be adduced as indirect evidence 
-- there is no basis for asserting that subsidies for local sales were 
used, in part, as leverage to encourage exports. 
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Without institutional knowledge on the operation of subsidies in
 
Taiwan (and no detailed studies of the business-government relationship
 
in Taiwan have been published), there is no way of knowing whether
 
Taiwan, too, used import protection as an indirect mechanism for
 
targeting subsidies to exporting firms. On the basis of Table 4, the
 
relatively lower subsidies for domestic sales in export-and-import­
competing in Taiwan as compared with Korea (and indeed the absence of
 
much differential between subsidies for export and domestic sales in
 
export-and-import-competing sectors) does hint that the Taiwanese may
 
have, at the very least, been less aggressive in their efforts at
 
targeted cross-subsidization than the Koreans.
 
What difference does it make to small and medium enterprises 
whether governments attempt to promote exports by conditionally 
targeting protection to benefit favored firms? Insofar as protection is 
targeted to those firms that offer the highest private recompense to 
relevant public officials, sinall and medium enterprises are at an 
obvious disadvantage. 23/ Put even without side payments, in practice 
targeted cross-subsidizatio: is likely to discriminate against small 
and medium enterprises. The reason parallels the earlier discussion of 
fixed transactions costs, only now the relevant transactions costs are 
not those of the fir-n but of government officials. The time and effort 
required to negotiate a subsidy in return for a specific response is 
likely to vary little across firms of different sizes. But the absolute 
magnitude of the export response is likely to be greater the larger is 
the size of the targeted firm. It follows that the government official 
seeking to promote exports will rationally allocate scarce time to 
negotiating cross-subsidization arrangements orly with larger firms. 
-15-

Export Promotion in a Free Trade Regime
 
The three mechanisms explored above are ones where the governments
 
in Taiwan and Korea provided firms with export incentives that either
 
offset those penalties against export that resulted from the
 
persistence of protection against import competition in both countries,
 
or used the persistence of protection as a basis for targeting benefits
 
to favored firms. But both countries also undertook to promote exports
 
in ways that were entirely unrelated to their parallel policies of
 
protection for local markets. The governments in both countries
 
provided a range of credit and tax subsidies for exporting firms:
 
details of these subsidies are readily available 24/ and will not be
 
reproduced here. What will be explored are two sets of institutional
 
innovations used to further the export drive. The first has to do with
 
the ways in which exporting firms in both countries, with limited
 
governmental assistance, overcame barriers to entering export markets.
 
The second set of innovations to be explcred is the process whereby the
 
Korean government (though not its Taiwanese counterpart) planned and
 
oversaw the entire export drive of that country in a collaborative
 
relationship with private firms.
 
Marketing exports abroad. Once firms have developed the capacity
 
to produce products that are competitive in price and quality on
 
international markets, they still face the task of selling their wares
 
abroad. In the initial stages of export expansion, both Korea ana
 
Taiwan relied heavily on the initiatives of those foreign buyers who
 
responded both to the general signals that these countries had the
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potential to be low-cost, stable export suppliers, and to the specific
 
efforts to attract overseas buyers by public agencies established by
 
the two governments specifically for that purpose.
 
The Korean government created and financed KOTRA (Korean Trade
 
Promotion Corporation) in 1962 to provide information about Korean
 
exporters and importers. 25/ In Taiwan, initially the Ministry of
 
Economic Affairs stationed economic counsellors in many countries;
 
then, as it became apparent that Taiwanese embassies might lose their
 
accreditation abroad, the government helped sponsor Far East Trade
 
Servines, an export promotion operation that worked through the
 
semi-official China External Trade Development Council.
2 6 /
 
Along with these governmental agencies and the foreign buyers they
 
attracted, important initial assistance in export marketing in both
 
Korea and Taiwan came from Japanese trading companies; in the early
 
1960s, these sogo shosha marketed fully 60 percent of all textile
 
imports from Taiwan. 27/ In additiLn, as was implied by the earlier
 
discussion of EPZs, Taiwan, but not Korea, actively courted foreign
 
investors able to provide ready access to overseas markets. Thus the
 
cumulative value of foreign investment in Taiwan prior to 1970 -- $421
 
million -- was more than fourfold the equivalent value in Korea.
 
Between 1970 and 1974 a further $867 million flowed into Taiwan; the
 
to $700 million.28 /
Korean inflow over the 1970-1975 period amounted 

As the export drive progressed, both the Korean and Taiwanese
 
governments provided special incentives to encourage the development of
 
29/
 
national. institutions with the capacity to market exports directly.
 
Even so, as Table 5 reveals, fewer than 20 percent of new export
 
opportunitie3 between 1974 and 1976 for a sample of 69 firms came about
 
Table 5: 	 Mechanjsms of Initial Contact with New Export Markets by Korean
 
Firms, 1974-1976
 
Number of Contacts Percentage
 
Contact initiated by 98 45.0%'
 
foreign buyers
 
Contact initiated by 43 19.7
 
exporting firm
 
Contact through2 orean 36 17.4
 
intermediary
 
Other3 /  
 39 	 17.9
 
TOTAL 	 218 100.0%
 
Source: 	Y. W. Rhee, B. Ross-Larson and S. Pursell, Korea's Competitive Edge:
 
Managing the Entry into World Markets (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
 
Press for World Bank, 1984) pp. 134-5
 
Notes : 	1/ The contacts were those of a sample of 66 firms
 
2/ 	Korean trading firms, KOTRA, sectoral trade associations, and other
 
Korean firms doing business in the country
 
3/ 	Discussion following trade fairs, enquiry from affiliates of foreign
 
firm to which Korean firm already exporting
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as a result of initiatives of the exporting firms themselves, while
 
over 40 percent of the new opportunities were initiated by foreign
 
buyers. Thus in 1975 Korean trading companies accounted for only 12
 
percent of the value of Korean exports. Subsequently the share of
 
exports rose rapidly to reach 48.2 percent by 1982.30/
 
To what extent do the opportunities of small and medium
 
enterprises to export vary across these different institutional
 
mechanisms of exporting? It follows from the earlier discussion of
 
indirect exports that the larger are the fixed information costs
 
associated with a particular mechanism, the greater will be the
 
disincentive against exports by small and medium firms. Thus, small and
 
medium firms are hardly likely to export directly themselves. They will
 
have opportunities to sell to foreign buyers only insofar as these
 
buyers are willing to absorb the transactions costs of dealing with
 
large numbers of small firms in return for the security of a
 
diversified source of supply. National trading companies also could in
 
principle provide small and medium firms with access to foreign markets
 
at relatively low transactions costs to the firms, although whether
 
this access is provided in practice will depend on the opportunity
 
costs to the trading companies of the time spent in transactions with
 
small and medium firms. 3
1/
 
Government-directed implementation of export promotion. Of all the
 
mechanisms examined in this paper, it is in this final mechanism -- the
 
degree to which government cajoled, collaborated with, and pressured
 
firms to expand their export activities -- that the differences between
 
Korea and Taiwan appear to be greatest.
 
There has been no detailed institutional analysis of the role the
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Taiwanese government played in that country's export drive. Even so, a
 
recurrent theme in research on the political economy of Taiwan is the
 
wide status and language gap between the Kuomintang government staffed
 
predominantly by mainlanders who crossed over to Taiwan in the late
 
1940s, and business which is disproportionately controlled by native
 
32/
 
Taiwanese. Although not in explicit reference to this gap, one
 
scholar has depicted the relationship between business and government
 
as follows:
 
"managers of both large and small firms feel they operate
 
at the will of the government, which is considered at best
 
capricious .... people in industry feel strong antipathy, mixed
 
with awe, toward government officials. These officials are
 
considered incapable of continuous and effective action
 
and, like the government they compose, are freque5 y felt
 
to behave arbitrarily and with a haughty manner".
 
The Korean government, like its Taiwanese counterpart, also is the
 
dominant partner in its relationship with business. But the way in
 
which it has gone about asserting its power has been radically
 
different from the Taiwanese pattern, as the following quotation from
 
one important study of business-government relations in Korea suggests:
 
" .... the bureaucratic decision-making structure has been
 
able continually and successfully to adapt to rapidly
 
changing conditions..... government policy response is
 
typically closer to the alacrity of a crack air-force
 
unit scrambling to the attack than to the lethargy usually
 
associated with bureaucracy .... The Korean policy-making
 
style is one of diving in, getting started, observing results,
 
adjusting policy, and repeating the process until the
 
appropriate mix is found ....Policies are often made with
 
low levels of generality; for example, for application to
 
a single firm .... There is virtually unlimited freedom of
 
economic expression with various levels of government quite
 
receptive to the opinions of businessmen, academics and
 
foreigners.... the level of governmp intervention is
 
high and has a positive net impact."
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The activist orientation of the Korean government is reflected in
 
oversee the nation's
the institutional mechanisms it established to 

export drive. Three of these mechanisms will briefly be described
 
firms in Korea have been subject
here. 3 5/ First, since the early 1960s 

to annual export targets; initially these targets took the form of
 
directives from government, but over time the input of firms in target
 
setting progressively increased; data on performance in relations to
 
the targets is transmitted on a daily basis to the head of the export
 
promotion office of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Second,
 
since 1965 the government has convened monthly export promotion
 
meetings, chaired by the nation's president; participants at these
 
meetings include senior cabinet ministers, the heads of some of the
 
nation's larger firms, and the chief executives of key export
 
associations. Third, the government declared Korea's first Export Day
 
on 30 November 1964, when Korean exports first passed the $100 million
 
mark; the day has been celebrated each year thereafter, highlighted by
 
the award of prizes for the most successful exporting firms.
 
What has been the impact of these efforts on exports? A survey of
 
felt that their export targets
106 firms found that 62% of these firms 
had led to increases in exports, while only 14% claimed the targets had 
made nc difference to the growth of production.
3 6 / Over 60 percent of 
the firms agreed that the monthly export meetings significantly 
affected their export performance, in part through the effects of 
exhortation, and in part through accomodation by government "resolving 
difficulties or delays in the firm's dealings with government
 
ministries". 3 7 / Underlying these positive responses appears to be the 
implicit threat of government sanction: 3 8 / almost three-fourths of the 
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firms that responded to the survey viewed the most important advantage
 
of good export performance to be its implied assurance of continued
 
government support for the firm's efforts.
 
Although collaborative decision-making between business and
 
government may well have accelerated export growth in Korea, it is
 
entirely possible that this acceleration was at the expense of small
 
and medium enterprises: as was argued earlier in the context of
 
cross-subsidization, government officials seeking to promote exports
 
are more likely to allocate their scarce time to pressure -- and in
 
return to nurture with special favors -- large firms capable of a more
 
substantial absolute response than their smaller counterparts. Indeed,
 
given the relatively moderate differences between the two countries in
 
the way they used the other mechanisms examined in this paper,
 
the centrality of collaborative business-government decision-making in
 
Korea and its apparent paucity in Taiwan, stands out as the mechanism
 
(of those examined here) most likely to help account for the
 
disproportionately large role of small and medium enterprises in
 
Taiwan, and their disproportionately small presence in Korea.
 
Some Hypotheses that Warrant Further Exploration
 
This paper has attempted to achieve two complementary purposes. It
 
has endeavored to delineate some institutional aspects of the
 
outward-oriented economic policies in Taiwan and Korea; and it has
 
explored the implications for small and medium enterprises of this
 
selected set of mechanisms of export promotion. Although more
 
definitive conclusions must await the results of field research in the
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two countries, four provocative hypotheses have emerged from the
 
initial exercise.
 
The first hypothesis is that small and medium enterprises may have
 
more difficulty in participating in export trade than large firms
 
insofar as the fixed informational costs of selling abroad are
 
substantial. This is not to say that small and medium enterprises will
 
necessarily be disadvantaged in countries that have adopted
 
outward-oriented policies. What it does imply, however, is that special
 
governmental atterition may have to be given, first to ensure that there
 
exist intermediary trading institutions that absorb the informational
 
costs of learning about foreign markets and thereby provide small and 
to ensure 

there is not unintended discrimination against indirect exports in the
 
prevailing constellation of trade policies.
 
medium enterprises access to these markets and, second, that
 
As for the second hypothesis, from the perspective of small and 
medium enterprises seeking to expand exports, a laissez faire 
outward-oriented policy is preferable to a policy involving protection 
plus tariff drawbacks, even if these drawbacks are provided 
automatically to exporting firms. The logic here is that any 
bureaucratic o'rerlay on top of a free trade regime involves 
transactions costs for firms, and these transactions costs impose a 
disproportionate burden on small and medium enterprises. 
The third hypothesis addresses not so much the relative position
 
of small and medium enterprises as it does differences in the structure
 
of outward-oriented policies in Korea and Taiwan. On the basis of the
 
evidence summarized in this paper, it does not ;ppear useful to
 
distinguish between the two countries in terirs of the degree to which
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their policies are laissez faire in character. Economic policies in
 
both countries involve a significant degree of intervention and control
 
on the part of their respective governments. Where they differ is in
 
the balance between the punitive and promotional functions of their
 
mechanisms of control. The rather limited evidence currently available
 
suggests that controls" in Taiwan tend to be punitive in their function,
 
implicit threats to firms to toe the line or suffer the wrath of
 
government.39 / By contrast in Korea, although the punitive element is
 
by no means absent, the government also has fostered a relationship of
 
'partial mutuality'4 0/ with business in order to promote its economic
 
objectives.
 
It is perhaps a paradox that the relative embrace of business in
 
Korea has had the practical, if unintended, consequence of
 
discriminating against small and medium enterprises. Indeed in general,
 
and this is the final hypothesis, given the relationship between the
 
transactions costs to a bureaucracy of dealing directly wi h individual
 
firms and the absolute magnitude of response on the part of
 
enterprises, it seems plausible that the greater the degree to which
 
governments use methods of direct, discretionary intervention to
 
achieve their economic goals the more difficult is likely to 1e the
 
economic environment for small and medium enterprises.
 
These four hypotheses suggests that -- as the title of this paper 
Implies -- there are both opportunities and perils for small and medium
 
enterprises in an outward-oriented industrial strategy. The perils lie
 
in the possibility that even with the best will towards small and
 
medium enterprises in the world, the mechanisms designed to implement
 
outward-oriented policies can have the effect of excluding these firms
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from export trade. But in principle, if careful attention is paid to
 
the impact of these mechanisms on small and mediuan enterprises, there
 
is no reason why they cannot share in the fruits of outward-oriented
 
policies and the accompanying expansion of manufactures exports. If
 
this paper has made even a modest beginning in identifying how the
 
perils can be circumvented and the opportunities embraced, then it has
 
accomplished its purpose.
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ENDNOTES
 
1. 	For overviews of three major research efforts that yielded this
 
result, see Balassa (1982), Krueger (1978), and Little, Scitovsky
 
and Scott (1970).
 
2. 	 For one review of the Korean experience, see Kim and Roemer (1979);
 
for Taiwan, see Ho (1978) and the articles in Galenson (1979).
 
3. 	For example, see the articles in Balassa (1982); also Kim and
 
Roemer (1979) and Ho (1978).
 
4. 	Although note that the Taiwanese dollar became overvalued for a
 
brief period in 1974 and 1975, and the real won value of exports
 
in Korea rose after 1970,
 
5. 	Westphal (1978) p. 20
 
6. 	Almost half of the total value of incentives -- 29.8% of total
 
merchandise exports, according to Westphal and Kim (1982), p. 217.
 
7. 	The Taiwanese data are from Scott p. 334; the Korean from Westphal 
and Kim p. 217. Insofar as export and import values approximate 
one another in the two countries, the data sugt st a somewhat 
larger role for the drawback system in Korea. The data in Tables 
3 and 4 - which point to relatively higher effective subsidies 
in Taiwan than in Korea and thus potentially (though not in 
practice) greeter scope for rebates in the former country -­
reinforce this conclusion. Note though that Tables 3 and 4 measure
 
subsidies only for manufacturing. When effective subsidies for all
 
sectors -- including non-manufacturing -- are compared, the 
difference in subsidy levels between the two countries all but
 
disappears. 
8. 	For Korea, see Westphal and Kim (1982) p. 216; for Taiwan, Lin
 
(1973) pp. 97-99.
 
9. 	Lin (1973) P. 102
 
10. 	 Rhee (1985) p. 85 
11. 	Paurice Scott has calculated -- Scott (1979) p. 335 - that for the 
average manufacturing establishment engaged in producing exports in 
Taiwan in 1971, rebates of import duty -- as well as commodity and 
other indirect taxes on exports -- equalled nearly three-fourths 
of value added and more than double estimated trading profits net 
of depreciation, but gross of income tax and interest payments.
 
Given these magnitudes, it is implausible that exports could have
 
expanded as they did (given the protective tariffs) in the absence
 
of rebate schemes. 
12. According to Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell (1984) p. 11, Korean
 
firms qualify for export licenses only once their exports exceed
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$1 million annually. It is not clear whether smaller firmE that
 
export through general trading companies nonetheless have
 
automatic access to the various incentives for export.
 
13. 	Py showing evidence of final exports, and using input-output 
coefficients to calculate the value of their inputs in these 
exports.
 
14. 	Little (1979) p. 483. 
15. 	On the ba-sis of conversations with government officials and firm 
managers, Westphal (1978) p. 27 -- by contrast with Little (1979) 
-- concluded that indirect exporters do not enjoy such extensive 
protection. Rather, indirect exporters get no payment from 
governments, but direct exporters can apply for rebates of any 
import tariffs paid by their suppliers. Mbreover, because of the 
paperwork involved, the producers interviewed by Westphal sought 
indirect rebates only for major input purchases. If Westphal is 
correct, indirect exporters in Taiwan enjoy no more -- and possibly 
less -- support than in Korea. 
16. 	Scott (1979) p. 337
 
17. 	Rhee (1985) p. 67
 
18. 	The Taiwanese data is from Ranis (1979) p. 238.
 
19. 	This amounted to one-third of total electronics production in
 
Taiwan; Hofheinz and Calder (1982) p. 189.
 
20. Data for Taiwan from Lee and Liang (1982) p. 317; for Korea from 
Rhee (1985) P. 67. 
21. 	Ranis (1979) p. 248.
 
22. 	ibid p. 251.
 
23. 	There is no evidence that corruption has been a pervasive problem
 
in either Korea or Taiwan. 
24. 	 For a summary of the incentives in Korea, see Jones and Sakong 
(1979) PP. 94-5; for Taiwan, see Lee and Liang (1982), Lin (1973)
 
and Westphal (1978).
 
25. 	Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pirsell (1984) p. 52.
 
26. 	Scott (1979) in Galenson, p. 342.
 
27. 	ibid p. 367.
 
28. 	For the Taiwanese data, see Ranis (1979) p. 247; for Korea, see 
Westphal and Kim (1982) p. 251. 
29. 	For a brief description of the incentives in Taiwan, see Westphal
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(1978), P. 31; for Korea, see Rhee et. al. (1984). Westphal 
implies that the level of marketing assistance afforded exporters 
by the Taiwanese government fell short of the efforts of its 
Korean counterpart. 
30. 	 Rhee et. al. (1984) p. 148-9. It is not clear to what degree this 
shift represents a change in the mechanism of exporting rather 
than a difference in the definition of the medium of export. 
31. 	 The Korean trading company, Korea Trade, specializes in the exports 
of small and medium-scale producers; the value of its cxports rose 
from $18 million in 1975 to $75 million by 1982.
 
32. Gates (1981) in Ahern and Gates pp. 255-256; also Kerr (1965).
 
Aside from scattered remnants of an earlier indigenous population,
 
the 'native' Taiwanese themselve3 migrated from southern provinces
 
of mainland Chinn in the course of the nineteenth century.
 
33. Silin (1976) p. 16
 
34. 	 Collated ftam Jones and Sakong (1979) pp. 290-292. It may be worth 
noting that one disgruntled Taiwanese business executive commented 
explicitly that " ....in Korea the government helps business plan 
and is co-cperative. Here there are more problems and government 
controls"; Silin p. 20. 
35. 	For additional details, see Rhee et. al. (1984)
 
36. 	ibid, p. 91.
 
37. 	ibid p. 34 
38. 	 Jones and Sakung (1979) P. 109 argue that the key mechanism of 
control of the Korean government is its control over the allocation 
of credit.
 
39. 	For further discussion of the way in which the state controls
 
business in Korea see Amsden (1984); for an analysis in a
 
different context of how economic policy can be used as a
 
mechanism of political control, see Bates.
 
40. 	 The phrase is from Jones and Sakong (1979) 
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